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Overview of the Application and Treatment of Act
312 in Federal Courts
Charles A. Nunmaker*
INTRODUCTION
The introduction and implementation of title 30, section 29 of the
Louisiana Revised Statutes and articles 1552 and 1563 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure—collectively known as “Act 312”—into the
legacy litigation arena has brought about interesting and complex
procedural considerations. Among these are the extent, if any, to which
the Act is applicable in federal courts.1 While the Act as a whole is roundly
recognized as procedural rather than substantive, certain of its elements
carry definite substantive overtones. On occasion, Louisiana’s federal
courts have adopted and employed some of these elements. This article
explores the development and evolution of Act 312—particularly
regarding its treatment by Louisiana’s federal courts—with the objective
of identifying those portions of the Act which have been, or are likely to
be, adopted by federal courts handling this type of legacy litigation.
The focus of this article rests upon a survey of federal litigation
implicating Act 312. Part I provides a basic history of Act 312. Parts II
and III explore pertinent authority regarding jurisdictional issues in federal
court litigation, with a particular eye to the Erie Doctrine and federal
abstention, respectively. Part IV then analyzes the substantive application
of Act 312 in the federal courts, concluding, in Part V, with an overview
of the Act’s implications in federal court litigation.
I. A BASIC HISTORY OF ACT 312
While a detailed discourse on the history of Act 312 (and, particularly,
of section 30:29) lies beyond the scope of this article, a general review is
Copyright 2016, by CHARLES A. NUNMAKER.
* Of Counsel with the law firm Krebs, Farley, PLLC. in New Orleans,
Louisiana; graduate of Tulane University (B.A. cum laude 1980) and Tulane
University School of Law (J.D. cum laude 1982; L.L.M. in Admiralty Law 1983).
1. “Act 312” is a generic label for 2006 La. Acts 312 (effective 6/08/06),
which amended and re-enacted LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:82(6), 89.1 and
2015.1(B), (C)(1), (2) and (4), (D), (E)(1), (F)(2), (H), (I) and (K), and enacted
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29, 29.1 and 2015.1(L). As used in this article, “Act
312” generally refers exclusively to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 and
subsequently implemented LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 1552 and 1563 (2015). As
a practical matter, most of the cases of note arose within the past ten years, but
prior to the coverage of the 2014 amendments to Act 312.

332

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

necessary to establish a chronological backdrop for the development of
federal jurisprudence relating to the Act.2 The proclaimed intent driving
the passage of Act 312 was “to effectuate an orderly and certain procedure
governing and implementing the remedy of environmental remediation in
oilfield legacy cases, once the plaintiffs have asserted, and proven, a claim
for remediation of environmental damages or the defendant has admitted
to liability therefor”3 and to effect the legislative charge of ensuring “that
damage to the environment is remediated to a standard that protects the
public interest.”4 Act 312 changed the remedy available in legacy litigation
cases by implementing a procedure aimed at safeguarding those elements
of judicial awards attributable to the remediation or restoration of
environmentally damaged properties to state regulatory standards.5 The
procedure set forth in the Act mandates the deposit of such funds into court
registries for judicial oversight and administration.6
Civilian doctrine has long provided the foundational basis for the
exercise of mineral rights in Louisiana, including in the context of
landowner claims of surface damage or contamination through abuse of
those rights. In early 2003, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Corbello v. Iowa Production,7 an opinion that was
monumental in two respects. First, it recognized that a successful
landowning plaintiff was not burdened with any obligation to dedicate
recovered damages to the restoration or remediation of the
2. See Loulan Pitre, Jr., “Legacy Litigation” and Act 312 of 2006, 20 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 347 (Summer, 2007) [hereinafter Pitre], for a complete and cogent
discussion of the history of Act 312.
3. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., Inc., 2012-0884, p.
29 (La. 1/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038, 1059 (Guidry, J., concurring opinion).
4. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (2007). LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 states:
“The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the
healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall
be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The
legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.”
5. Louisiana Land & Exploration, 110 So. 3d at 1049; M.J. Farms, Ltd. v.
Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371, p. 30 (La. 7/1/08); 998 So. 2d 16, 37; amended
on reh’g, 2007-2371, p. 33 (La. 09/19/08); 998 So. 2d 40. In Savoie v. Richard,
13-1370 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/2/14); 137 So. 3d 78, the Louisiana Supreme Court
required the deposit into the district court’s registry of the full $38 million
judgment for remediation to state requirements, even though the approved plan of
remediation amounted to only $3.9 million of that amount, subject to
reimbursement to the paying defendant, Shell Oil, of any amounts remaining in
the registry after the court-certified completion of the remediation required by the
plan. The plaintiffs in Savoie recovered a separate $18 million in damages not
covered by Act 312 for private excess remediation claims under the terms of their
mineral leases. Savoie, 137 So. 3d at 85 n.1.
6. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:29(C)(5–6), (D)(1–4) (2007).
7. Corbello v. Iowa Production, 2002-0826 (La. 2/25/03); 850 So.3d 686.
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environmentally damaged property.8 Second, relying upon the sanctity of
contractual terms and party expectations, the court held that damages
recoverable by a landowner for contractual breach of restoration
obligations were not restricted by the market value of the property in
question.9 The impact of Corbello was swift and significant; the case was
followed by the filing of a multitude of damage suits brought by Louisiana
landowners—in such volumes as to give rise to a specified nomenclature,
“legacy litigation,” to identify this type of suit.10
In the summer of 2003, title 30, section 2015.1 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes, the Groundwater Remediation Act (GRA) came into
being.11 Developed as an initial response to the rise of legacy litigation,
the statute is noteworthy in several respects. First, its passage introduces
the requirement that those filing adversarial claims for damages within the
statute’s scope provide written notice of the filing of the demand, through
certified mailing, return receipt requested, to the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality (LDEQ).12 An additional provision states that no
judgment or order granting relief in the litigation shall issue in the absence
of the requisite proof of such notification.13 Moreover, the statute, as
amended, recognizes the right of the LDEQ to intervene in any such
action.14 Section 30:2015.1 (C) and (D) of the Groundwater Remediation
Act provides for the submission, review, and judicial adoption or
structuring of a plan determined to be the most feasible plan for evaluating
and remediating contamination and protecting the condition of usable
ground water consistent with the public interest.15
Second, the law provides that all damages or payments in any civil
action for the evaluation and remediation of contamination or pollution,
8. In reaching this first conclusion, the court found no indication of
legislative consideration of the merits or detriments implicated by allowing
private landowners to control the decision of whether or not to use recovered
damages to restore contaminated land. However, the court declared that it was
clear that the legislature had implemented no procedure to ensure that the
landowners so devoted the recovered monies. Id. at 701.
9. Id. at 693–95.
10. Pitre, supra note 2, at 348; Marin v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2009-2368,
2009-2371 (La. 10/19/10); 48 So. 3d 234, 238 n.1.
11. 2003 La. Acts 1166, effective July 2, 2003. Prior to the enactment of LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 in 2006, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:2015.1 included both
the LDEQ and the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LDNR). As part
of Act 312, the legislature amended the provisions of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30:2015.1 to remove the LDNR from coverage under that statute. 2006 La. Acts
312, § 1.
12. This notice must be made through certified mailing, return receipt
requested. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B) (2016).
13. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B).
14. Id.
15. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (C), (D) (2016).
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potentially or actually impacting ground water resources, shall be paid into
the court registry.16 Disbursements of such amounts from the registry are
subject to continuing judicial oversight and management.17 The law also
contains provisions for awards of costs, fees, and expenses related to
claims within its ambit to successful litigants and public authorities.18
Finally, the preamble to the statute expresses legislative recognition that
the natural resources of the state are to be “protected, conserved and
replenished insofar as possible[,]” consistent with the public interest
therein, and that the legislature is mandated to enact laws to implement
such policy.19
Despite its novel elements, the statute remains limited in scope. In fact,
subsection (B) of the GRA restricts its coverage to claims “to recover
damages for the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or
pollution that is alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water.”20
Thus, the post-enactment cases tended to omit—if not to disclaim
entirely—allegations of breach or wrongdoing related to contamination or
pollution of usable ground water.21 In other words, the focus of post-2003
legacy litigation fell particularly upon claims of surface contamination.
Consequently, a perception grew that landowners were pursuing financial
windfalls at the expense of the public’s interest in maintaining
environmental quality—i.e., that the legislative void discussed in Corbello
had not been satisfactorily addressed.
This controversy led to the enactment of Act 312.22 The Act’s
resemblance to the GRA is unmistakable; all of the elements outlined in
the context of the GRA find direct counterparts in section 30:29. However,

16. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:2015.1 (E).
17. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (E)(4).
18. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (F).
19. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (A).
20. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (B).
21. See, e.g., Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. Apache Corp., 2:05-cv-00322, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36594, pp. 17–19, 2005 WL 3543772 (E.D.La. 10/13/05); Frank C.
Minvielle, L.L.C. v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380 F.2d 755, 761 (W.D. La. 2004)
(note 19); LeJeune Bros. v. Goodrich Petroleum Co., L.L.C., 2006-1557, pp. 17–18
(La. App. 3d Cir. 11/28/07); 981 So.2d 23,35, writ den., 2008-0298 (La. 04/04/2008),
978 So.2d 327. “[M]any petitions expressly stated that [landowners] were not bringing
claims for contamination or pollution of usable ground water subject to section 2015.1,
removing such litigation from the effect of section 2015.1.” Pitre, supra note 2, at 349.
22. See supra note 1. The provisions of Act 312 became effective on June 8,
2006, and they applied to suits on record as of that date, except for any case in
which the court, on or before March 27, 2006, had issued or signed an order setting
the case for trial, and in which the litigant filing such demand for environmental
damage did not exercise the right of designating the case for coverage under the
Act. 2006 La. Acts 312, §§ 2–3.
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the areas of coverage remain separate and distinct.23 By express provision,
section 30:29 relates to “the procedure for judicial resolution of claims for
environmental damage to property arising from activities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Department of Natural Resources, office of conservation.”24
The statute’s primary distinction lies in its application to “environmental
damage,”25 as opposed to the province of the GRA over “contamination or
pollution that is alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water.”26
Additionally, section 30:29 entails the involvement of the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources (LDNR), while the GRA now involves only
the LDEQ.27
Prior to 2012, Act 312 was generally characterized as consisting of six
primary elements:
1) Timely Notice. Act 312 requires that timely notice shall be
furnished to the LDNR and to the Louisiana Office of Attorney
General (LOAG) immediately upon the assertion of a judicial
demand relating to a claim for environmental damage.28
2) Stay. The litigation in which such judicial demand is asserted
shall be stayed for a period of thirty days after such notice is
issued and the return receipt thereof is filed with the court.
3) State Intervention. Under subsection 30:29(B)(2), the State
(particularly, the LOAG and the LDNR) has the prerogative—
but not the obligation—of intervening in such litigation in
accordance with the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
4) Determination of Most Feasible Plan. Subsection C of section
30:29 specifies the role and function of LDNR’s Office of
Conservation (OCC) in the review, development, and
submission of plan(s) for the evaluation and/or remediation of
environmental damage.
23. In conjunction with the 2006 enactment of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29,
subsection (L) was added to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1 (2016) to expressly
provide that the latter “shall not apply to oilfield sites or exploration and
production (E&P) sites regulated by the Department of Natural Resources, office
of conservation.” Such sites were expressly noted to be the same sites within the
definitions and coverage of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(4) (2007). See supra
note 11.
24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(A) (2016).
25. Id.
26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B) (2016). LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30:2015.1(L) (2016) provides expressly that the statute shall not apply to oilfield
sites or exploration and production sites regulated by LDNR.
27. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1.
28. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:29(B)(1).
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5) Provision for Payment of Damages. The statute provides for the
payment of all claims associated with the evaluation or
remediation of environmental damages and it further provides
that the court shall oversee the actual implementation of the plan
adjudicated to be “most feasible.”29
6) State Recovery of Costs and Expenses. Section 30:29(E)
addresses the recovery from the responsible party of costs, fees,
and expenses by successful litigants and by the State.30
In addition to the six foregoing elements, subsections 30:29(J)(1) and
(2)—both part of the original statute—establish what could be described as
another fundamental element of the Act:
7) Settlement Oversight. Court approval is required for any
settlement reached in connection with a case subject to the
statute.31 Moreover, notice of the settlement must be
communicated to the LOAG and the LDNR, both of which have
a statutory minimum thirty day period to review the given
settlement and comment to the court before any judicial
confirmation of the settlement occurs.32 If the court requires
remediation after a contradictory hearing, the court shall not
certify or approve any settlement until monies sufficient to fund
such remediation are deposited into the registry of the court.33
The court has the prerogative of waiving the requirements of the
statute if the settlement is for a minimal amount and is not
dispositive of the entire case.34 Subsection (J) includes provision
for the recovery of costs, expenses, and fees by the LDNR and
the LOAG if either had intervened in the matter prior to the
settlement having been reached.

29. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:29(D), (F).
30. These six elements were delineated in 2007 in Pitre, 20 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. at
350–53. The Louisiana Supreme Court reiterated the six-element description of the
Act in M. J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371, p. 29 (La. 07/01/08); 998
So. 2d 16, 36, amended on reh’g, 2007-2371, p. 33 (La. 09/19/08); 998 So. 2d 40.
31. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(J)(1) (2007).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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In 2012, Act 312 was revised and amended to introduce additional
procedures,35 more particularly described as follows:
8) The Notice of Intent to Investigate. The 2012 amendments
added subsection (B)(7) of title 30, section 29 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes to provide for the suspension of up to one
year of the prescriptive period applicable to any claim covered
under the statute upon service on the LDNR and key parties
of a notice of intent to investigate alleged environmental
damage and the identification of environmental testing
information in any judicial demand filed subsequent thereto.
9) The Environmental Management Order. The Environmental
Management Order is a mechanism for managing the
investigation, testing, and discovery procedures related to
environmental damage cases. It was established under
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1552, which was
enacted through the 2012 amendments to Act 312.36
10) The Preliminary Hearing. The 2012 amendments also enacted
subsection 30:29(B)(6), which sets forth the procedure for a
preliminary hearing to traverse “whether there is good cause
for maintaining the defendant as a party in the litigation.” The
hearing process specifically focuses upon the plaintiff’s
allegations of environmental damage and causation.37 A
claimant bears the prima facie burden of introducing evidence
to support the allegations of environmental damage.38 After
that, the preliminary hearing movant has the burden of
establishing the absence of genuine issue of material fact as to
that party’s lack of legal responsibility for the alleged
environmental damage. Any dismissal as a result of a
preliminary hearing shall be without prejudice. However, if
the dismissed defendant is not rejoined, that defendant shall
be entitled to a judgment of dismissal with prejudice
following entry of the final judgment in the case-in-chief. The
35. 2012 La. Acts 779, sec. 1. Section 2 of Act 779 provided, “The provisions of
the Act shall not apply to any case in which the court on or before May 15, 2012, has
issued or signed an order setting the case for trial, regardless of whether such trial
setting is continued.” The effective date of the 2012 amendments was August 1, 2012.
The same provision was included in Section 3 of 2012 La. Acts 754, which rendered
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 1552 and 1563 (2016) effective as of August 1, 2012.
36. 2012 La. Acts 754, sec. 1.
37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(6) (2016).
38. Id.
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preliminary hearing procedure is available in addition to the
general pretrial rights and remedies available to all party
litigants under the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.
11) The Limited Admission of Responsibility for Environmental
Damage. The original terms of Act 312 allowed for a responsible
party’s admission of liability for environmental damage.39
However, the 2012 amendments introduced article 1563 and its
concept of the limited admission of liability for environmental
damage into the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. More
specifically, article 1563 provides for an admission of liability
for environmental damage limited to a party’s responsibility to
implement the most feasible plan to evaluate and, if necessary,
to remediate to regulatory standards all or a portion of the
contamination that is the subject of the litigation or remediation.
The limited admission does not constitute an admission of
liability for private damages liability under subsection 30:29(H),
and it cannot result in any waiver of the admitting party’s rights
and defenses in such a case. However, the admission is subject
to the evidentiary parameters set forth in articles 702–705 of the
Louisiana Code of Evidence and in article 1425 of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure. Article 1563(A)(6) of the Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure additionally requires the deposit of a
minimum $100,000 sum to cover the cost of the OCC’s review
of the plans and submittals under section 30:29, subject to
reimbursement to the payor of any unused amounts.40
12) Waiver of Indemnification for Punitive Damage Liabilities.
Subsection 30:29(L), also added through the 2012 amendments,
mandates that when a responsible party admits liability for
remediation of environmental damage pursuant to the terms of
the statute, the admission constitutes a waiver of the right to
enforce contractual indemnification clauses bearing on punitive
damages arising out of environmental damage covered under Act
312.41
Act 312 was amended and modified once again in 2014, but with the
provision that the changes would not apply to (1) any case filed before
39. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(1) (2007).
40. 2012 La. Acts 754, sec. 1.
41. For a listing of the key elements added by the 2012 amendments, see Loulan
Pitre Jr., Six Years Later: Louisiana Legacy Lawsuits since Act 312, 1 LSU J. OF
ENERGY L. & RESOURCES (2012), available at http://digitalcommons.law.lsu
.edu/jelr/vol1/iss1/10.
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March 10, 2014; or (2) any case in which the court had, on or before that
date, issued or signed an order setting the case for trial, regardless of
whether the trial setting had been continued.42 These amendments became
effective on August 1, 2014.
Subsection 30:29(B)(6) was modified to provide for the award of fees
and costs in favor of any named defendant which succeeded at the
preliminary hearing stage and was not later rejoined into the action. This
element is generally regarded as a penal-type sanction against a plaintiff’s
assertion of a frivolous Act 312 claim against a given defendant.43
Additionally, the legislature added subsection 30:29(C)(2)(c), which
establishes a rebuttable presumption in cases of a limited admission of
liability under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1563. That
presumption provides that the plan approved or structured by the LDNR
(after appropriate consultation with LDEQ) represents the most feasible
plan to address the environmental damage made subject of the limited
admission.44 Upon a party’s request, the jury is to be instructed to this
effect.45 Article 1563(A)(2) was likewise amended to include the same
substantive wording.
“Contamination” had always been a key element of the definition of
“environmental damage” under Act 312, but the 2014 amendments added
an express definition for the term “contamination.”46 The new statute
states that “contamination” means, “the introduction or presence of
substances or contaminants into a usable ground water aquifer, an
underground source of drinking water (USDW) or soil in such quantities
as to render them unsuitable for their reasonably intended purposes.”47
Thus, in the context of “any actual or potential impact, damage, or injury
to environmental media caused by contamination resulting from activities
42. 2014 La. Acts 400, Section 3. 2015 La. Acts, No 448 did not directly
amend LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2007), but enacted LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
30:29.2, which requires a “meet and confer” of the parties to LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:29 cases within sixty days of the end of the stay provided by LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 30:29(B)(1), in an effort to assess the dispute, narrow the issues, and reach
agreements pertaining to the litigation of the action. The statute also provides
mechanisms for convening and conducting mediations of such cases. The
effective date of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29.2 occurred on August 1, 2015, with
applicability extending to those cases then pending which had not then been set
down for trial, or which are set down for trial—originally or as continued—after
February 1, 2016.
43. See, e.g., Kaki J. Johnson, The Migration from the Rig to the Courthouse:
Oil and Gas Legacy Litigation in Louisiana, 60 LOY. L. REV. 647, 682 (Fall 2014).
44. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:29(C)(2)(c) (2016).
45. Id.
46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(1) (“Contamination”) and (2)
(“Environmental damage”).
47. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 30:29(I)(1).

340

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

associated with oilfield sites or exploration and production sites[,]”
consideration of “environmental damage” must involve the assessment of
contamination under the new definition.48 Of course, the burden initially
faced by a plaintiff attempting to survive a preliminary hearing under
subsection 30:29(B)(6) and article 1563 requires the introduction of
evidence to support the allegations of environmental damage.49 The 2014
amendment appears to heighten that burden, at least to the extent that it
requires an additional degree of proof relating to contamination.
In what may have been a response to the Louisiana Supreme Court’s
opinion in State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Company,
Inc.,50 the 2014 amendments eliminated the provision of section 30:29(H)(1),
which had provided that nothing in that section should be construed to
“preclude a judgment ordering damages for or implementation of additional
remediation in excess of the requirements of the plan adopted by the court
pursuant to this Section, as may be required in accordance with the terms of
an express contractual provision.”51 Furthermore, the 2014 amendments
added a clause to section 30:29(H)(1) specifying that any award granted in
connection with the judgment for additional remediation in excess of the
requirements of the feasible plan adopted by the court would not have to be
paid into the registry of the court.52 At the same time, the legislature added a
sentence to subsection 30:29(H)(2) stating that awardable damages under the
statute would be governed by new subsection (M), which was added to the
statute for the purpose of delineating the elements of recoverable damages
under Act 312. Specifically, subsection (M) set out four exclusive categories
of damages recoverable in an action under Act 312:
1) the cost of funding the most feasible plan, as adopted by the
court;
2) the cost of any additional remediation required by an express
contractual provision providing for remediation to original
condition or to some other specific remediation standard;

48. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(I)(2).
49. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(6) and La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann.
art. 1563 (2016).
50. 12-0884 (La. 01/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038.
51. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (H)(1) (2012) (later amended).
52. Id.
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3) the cost of evaluating, correcting, or repairing environmental
damage shown to have been caused by unreasonable or
excessive operations,53 provided that such award is not
duplicative of any damages recovered in items (1) and (2); and
4) the cost of non-remediation damages.
Subsection (M) additionally provides that none of its provisions shall
be construed to alter the traditional burden of proof or to imply the
existence or extent of damages, or to affect an award of attorney’s fees or
costs under the other provisions of section 30:29.
II. THE ERIE CONUNDRUM: THE FUNDAMENTAL CHARACTER OF THE
ACT 312
The Erie doctrine frames the question of governing law in federal
courts.54 Louisiana’s federal courts generally apply the Erie analysis of
governing law as follows:
The district court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction, must apply the
substantive law of Louisiana, while employing Federal procedural
rules. In the absence of a valid Federal Civil Rule addressing the
point, the court must determine whether a particular rule is
procedural or substantive by considering the “twin aims of the
Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws.”55
The Erie characterization of Act 312 elements plays a critical role in
defining the legal analysis. Thus, in a federal diversity context, a
fundamental issue with regard to Act 312 lies in whether the statutory
provision under scrutiny is procedural or substantive in nature.

53. Subsection (M) spells out that the determination of unreasonableness or
excessiveness of operations with regard to Item (3) is to be assessed under the
rules, regulations, lease terms, and implied lease obligations arising by operation
of law, or under standards applicable at the time of the activity that is the subject
of the complaint. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:29(M).
54. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
55. Frank C. Minvielle v. IMC Global Operations, 380 F.Supp.2d 755, 759
(W.D. La., 2004) (citing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965)). If the diversity case involves an unsettled
question of state substantive law, the federal court must apply an “Erie-guess” as to
how the state’s highest court would resolve the issue. If the state’s highest court has
not yet spoken on the issue, federal courts may refer to the rulings of the state’s
intermediate appellate courts for guidance. TS & C Investments, L.L.C. v. Beusa
Energy, Inc., 637 F.Supp.2d 370, 373–74 (W.D. La., 2009).
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Until the 2014 amendments, as a matter of Louisiana state law, the
answer was certain: “30:29 is procedural, rather than substantive, and does
not create a right of action in favor of landowners.”56 Indeed, the Louisiana
Supreme Court recognized section 30:29 to be a “solely procedural
statute” that does not create or abrogate any substantive rights.57 The
courts cited subsection 30:29(H) as principal support for this conclusion.58
In some instances, federal courts considering Act 312 have reached
the same conclusion that the Act is procedural rather than substantive.
Accordingly, courts abiding by this conclusion found no compelling need
under Erie to employ Act 312 as governing law.59 In other instances, the
courts have found it unnecessary to reach an Erie determination,
concluding that specific terms of Act 312 are of fundamental significance
or can otherwise be read to open the door to the exercise of inherent
judicial discretion. In this way, federal judges find the latitude to adopt
pre-trial and trial procedures that are consistent with Act 312’s approach
to the handling of legacy litigation cases.60
That being said, the enactment of the 2014 amendments to Act 31261
raises the prospect of renewed focus upon the debate concerning the
procedural or substantive nature of the Act—particularly in the federal
courts. While the essential general characterization of the Act as
procedural does not appear to have changed, the addition of subsection
30:20(M) and its delineation of compensable Act 312 damage elements
brings with it the potential of new Erie-based legal arguments. The most
that can be said at this juncture is that the question of whether the 2014
amendments to section 30:29 introduced substantive elements of law has
yet to be definitively resolved in the jurisprudence.

56. Wagoner v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 45-507, pp. 12–13 (La. App. 2d Cir.
11/24/10); 55 So.3d 12, 26 (on rehearing).
57. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., Inc., 2012-0884,
pp. 21–23 (La. 01/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038, 1053–54.
58. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2007-2371, p. 29 (La. 7/1/08);
998 So. 2d 16, 35–36.
59. See, Alford v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. 13 F.Supp.3d 581, 589 (E.D. La.
04/01/14) n.25 (order as modified); see also Alford v. Anadarko E&P Onshore,
L.L.C., 2:13-cv-05457 (ref 2:13-cv-05703), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55724, 2014
WL 1612454 (E.D. La. 04/22/14) (R.Doc. 165, n.25).
60. Consider, Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 538 F.Supp 954,
957-59 (E.D. La. 2007).
61. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (2016). See generally, 2014 La. Acts 400.
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III. THE ISSUE OF FEDERAL COURT ABSTENTION
In a manner similar to the Erie approach, federal courts have rejected
the position that Act 312 cases must be brought and heard exclusively in
Louisiana’s state courts. In the past, the argument typically presented by
plaintiffs (usually landowners whose cases have been removed to federal
court) was that federal court abstention was required under the so-called
Burford abstention doctrine. Alternatively, plaintiffs call for federal
deferral to the “primary jurisdiction” of the regulatory authorities (in the
particular case of Act 312, the LDNR).
A. Burford Abstention
The argument raised by parties seeking to effect abstention in legacy
litigation cases focused primarily upon the fact scenario arising in Burford
v. Sun Oil Co.62 In that case, an oil company sued in federal court to
collaterally attack the validity of a conservation order issued by the Texas
Railroad Commission (Commission), the mineral-rights regulatory
authority in Texas. The conservation order granted Burford a drilling
permit for four wells on a small piece of East Texas land.63 One of the
claims raised by the plaintiff was that the regulatory action represented a
deprivation of due process of law, but in essence, the case was a simple
proceeding in equity to enjoin the enforcement of the Commission’s order.
The central issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the federal
courts should intervene in a matter of such fundamental state interest and
discretion.64 The Court presented a full review of the Commission’s
history and its function as part of a coordinated state regulatory system—
a system complete with provision for thorough judicial review by the
Texas’ own courts. In the end, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]hese
questions of regulation of the industry by the state administrative agency,
whether involving gas or oil prorationing programs or Rule 37 cases [the
state’s well spacing rule], so clearly involves basic problems of Texas
policy that equitable discretion should be exercised to give the Texas
courts the first opportunity to consider them.”65 Hence, the species of
federal abstention recognized by the Court has come to be known as
Burford abstention.
The Burford abstention doctrine has been raised several times with regard
to Act 312, but it appears that none of these efforts has met with success.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 332.
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In 2007, the plaintiff in Brownell Land Co., L.L.C. v. Oxy USA, Inc.
opposed the post-removal litigation of its Act 312 suit in the Eastern
District of Louisiana, arguing that, under Burford, the court should
abstain from hearing the case out of deference to the role assigned the
LDNR under the Act.66 District Judge Carl Barbier, presiding over the
case, first noted the superficial appeal of the plaintiff’s argument, before
ultimately giving effect to binding Fifth Circuit authority set forth in
Webb v. B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc.67 Relying on Webb, Judge Barbier held
that a federal court cannot exercise Burford abstention in an Act 312
action for damages, since the court is not being asked to equitably weigh
competing interests.68 Rather, in an Act 312 case, the court has no
discretion on whether to award damages upon a jury’s determination
that, as a matter of fact, contamination existed.69 Application of Burford
abstention would therefore be inappropriate.70
Similarly, in C.S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Company of California,
District Judge Sarah Vance rejected a landowner’s assertion that Burford
required federal court abstention in a case brought under Act 312.71 The
basis for this determination was simple: “Plaintiffs’ contention that this
statute requires the Court to abstain under Burford ignores the fact that
they are asking primarily for damages and not equitable relief.”72
Applying Webb, the court found that Burford abstention does not apply
to cases involving legal, as opposed to equitable, claims.
Furthermore, the fact that the Gaidry complaint included a prayer for
injunctive relief to compel restoration of the property did not render
Burford applicable to the case. Addressing that contention, Judge Vance
reiterated the findings set forth prior to the enactment of Act 312 in a
different Brownell Land case, Brownell Land Co. v. Apache Corp.,
wherein District Judge Africk held that the disposition of legacy
litigation in a federal setting would involve no difficult or unsettled state

66. Brownell Land Co. v. Oxy USA, Inc., 538 F. Supp. 2d. 954, 958–59 (E.D.
La. 2007). See also supra, note 60, for other mention of this case.
67. 174 F.3d 697, 704–05 (5th Cir. 1999). The Webb case built upon the development of Burford abstention as set forth in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S.
706, 729, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996), with Webb recognizing the rule that
“a court may not remand pursuant to Burford abstention if the plaintiff seeks
damages.” Webb, 174 F.3d at 701. In essence, the Burford abstention doctrine has
been limited to actions in equity. Id.
68. Brownell Land, 538 F. Supp. 2d. at 958–59.
69. Id. at 959.
70. Id.
71. C.S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 2:09-cv-02762, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 83096, at *14 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 2009).
72. Id.
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law implicating substantial matters of state policy.73 The same rationale
underscored the rejection of Burford abstention in a 2010 GRA case
brought in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Louisiana.74
B. Brillhart Abstention in Declaratory Judgment Actions
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cureington represents a case of a federal
court’s deeming appropriate the grant of a stay in an Act 312 dispute.75
The distinctive feature of that suit, filed by Chevron in federal court in
response to the landowner’s threat to institute state court litigation, lay in
the fact that the Plaintiff sought purely declaratory relief.76 Chevron sought
a judgment declaring that it was not liable to the landowner under any
theory of liability for damages resulting from oil and gas operations
conducted on the property.77 Alternatively, Chevron sought a judicial
decree under section 30:29, referring the case to the LDNR for approval
of a remedial plan and authorizing Chevron to enter the property for the
purpose of implementing the approved remediation plan.78 The landowner
subsequently filed the state court action and soon thereafter launched a
direct summary challenge in the federal action against maintenance of the
federal case.79 Specifically, the landowner sought dismissal of the federal
declaratory judgment case on abstention grounds.80
At the outset of its analysis, the court found that Chevron’s inclusion
of the request for alternative relief in the form of referral to the LDNR
indicated “a calculated effort to thwart” the abstention doctrine
particularly applicable to declaratory judgment actions through Brillhart

73. Id. at *14–20; see Brownell Land Co. v. Apache Corp., 2:05-cv-00322,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36594, at *16 (E.D. La. Oct. 13, 2005).
74. Jumonville v. Hercules, 3:10-cv-00393, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115177
(M.D. La. Sept. 22, 2010), report adopted, 3:10-cv-00393, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115164 (M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2010).
75. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cureington, 3:10-cv-00764, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28978, 2011 WL 1085661 (W.D. La., Feb. 18, 2011), adopted by,
dismissed without prejudice by, 3:10-cv-00764, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28735
(W.D. La., Mar. 21, 2011).
76. Id. at *3–4.
77. Id. at *4–6.
78. Id.
79. Id. at *7–8.
80. Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *8.
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v. Excess Texas Employers’ Insurance Co. of America.81 In fact, the
landowner and Chevron had already agreed that, upon a finding of liability
in the state court action, the case should be referred to the LDNR for
implementation of a remediation plan.82 Because no dispute between the
parties existed as to this point, there was no justiciable case or controversy
to support the exercise of federal jurisdiction over Chevron’s alternative
claim.83 Therefore, the court considered the case to be a pure declaratory
judgment action subject to the edicts of Brillhart abstention.84 The court
concluded that Chevron’s federal suit amounted to a procedural forum
shopping maneuver that could not prevail over the interests of comity and
the prudent administration of justice as effected through state court
resolution of the case.85 The court recognized the appropriateness of
abstention, granted the landowner’s motion for summary judgment, and
dismissed the federal case without prejudice.86
The application of Brillhart abstention as recorded in Cureington is
limited to the remote factual scenario of an Act 312 defendant’s instituting
a federal declaratory judgment action in the face of state court litigation
on the same issues. As a general rule, the Brillhart abstention doctrine is
simply inapplicable to the typical Act 312 case of a federal suit brought by
a landowning plaintiff or a state suit removed to federal court.
C. Erie and Abstention Conclusions
Act 312 does not divest federal courts of original jurisdiction, and any
argument that the LDNR holds primary jurisdiction over remediation
matters to the exclusion of the federal or state judiciary has been put to
rest. Therefore, the position that Act 312 requires a federal court to defer
to the regulatory authority of the LDNR in legacy litigation cases or to
otherwise abstain from hearing the case has been soundly rejected.

81. Id. at *13 (referencing Brillhart v. Excess Texas Employers’ Insurance
Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)). This specific abstention doctrine
pertaining to declaratory judgments is generally referred to as “Brillhart
abstention.” The Brillhart abstention doctrine is based upon the principle that it
would be uneconomical as well as vexacious for a federal court to proceed with a
declaratory judgment action where another suit is pending in state court between
the same parties with the same non-federal issues. Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 495.
82. Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *13.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *12–13. In adopting such an approach, the court rendered arguments
for application of the more stringent parameters of Colorado River abstention
inapposite. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424
U.S. 800 (1976).
85. Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *28–29.
86. Id. at *30–31. See also Chevron, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28978, at *3–4.
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While the jurisprudential consensus is that the Act is procedural
overall, sweeping categorization can be perilous. As examination of the
case law bears out, certain elements of the statute have worked their way
into application by the federal courts, while other elements have been
expressly rejected.87 Moreover, the 2014 amendments to section 30:29,
and the enactment of subsection 30:29(M) in particular, may have
introduced new substantive elements into the analysis. Nevertheless,
federal courts have generally adhered to federal procedure in adjudicating
the various elements of legacy litigation complaints.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: PARTICULAR
ELEMENTS OF THE ACT
A. The Order of Trial and Assessment of the Most Feasible Plan
In Brownell Land88—a case that arose during the pendency of
Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C.89—Judge Barbier refused to
bifurcate the pending suit into separate proceedings for the determination
of liability and damages.90 The court held that Act 312 was procedural, so
that nothing precluded the court from presenting the damages case to the
same jury that was to decide liability.91 Moreover, the court found no
requirement under either Erie or the Act compelling separate treatment for
the damages associated with remediation.92 Judge Barbier explained:
[T]here is nothing wrong with a jury determination of the amount of
the damages. Thereafter [L]DNR will decide (with the court's
approval) how much of those damages are to be used for remediation.
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit has held that there is no need for a
second jury for damages, and there is no reason for this Court to

87. Consider Brownell Land Co., 538 F.Supp. at 957–59.
88. Id.
89. In a September 2008 ruling in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C.,
No. 1:04-cv-02177, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *6 (W.D. La. Sept. 29,
2008), the court opted against applying the “procedural aspects” of LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:29(C)(1) in a diversity case to order the development of a
remediation plan or similar procedural undertaking. Nevertheless, and in a “more
substantive vein,” the court affirmatively noted the statute’s provisions regarding
the substantive right to the recovery of costs, expenses, and attorney’s fees.
Weyerhaeuser, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *11-13. The Weyerhauser case
is discussed in different contexts, infra at Parts IV (B, C, E, F and H).
90. Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d. at 959.
91. Id.
92. Id.

348

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

disagree.93
In so ruling, the court effectively followed the Louisiana Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeal’s opinion in Duplantier Family Partnership v. B.P. Amoco.94
Moreover, Judge Barbier questioned the plaintiff’s supposition that the Act’s
provisions for a LDNR hearing during the pendency of litigation likely could
not be enforced upon removal of the case to federal court:
[I]t is unclear why that would be so. This court is bound to follow the
substantive law of the state, and even its procedural law, when it
affects substantive rights. Such a rule allows this Court to enforce
state procedural requirements related to medical malpractice, and it
is not clear why this case is any different. In each of these cases, the
federal court determined whether a plaintiff had complied with the
procedures of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act. Other Courts
have held that even though compliance with Medical Malpractice
schemes is procedural, it must be followed by a federal court sitting
in diversity. Regardless, this particular issue does not have to be
decided by this Court at this particular time.95
Separately, in another federal case involving Act 312, on April 1,
2014, Judge Vance rejected the notion that Act 312 could support an
independent substantive cause of action:
The Court does not interpret plaintiffs’ complaint to assert a
standalone claim under La. Rev. Stat. § 30:29. That statute is
‘procedural, rather than substantive, and does not create a right of
action in favor of landowners.’ Section 30:29 merely specifies the
procedures applicable to lawsuits alleging environmental damage;
the substantive law is supplied by the Louisiana Civil and Mineral
Codes and other applicable statutory law and jurisprudence.96
The Brownell Land order is fully consistent with the Louisiana
Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in State v. Louisiana Land &
Exploration Co., wherein the court described the order of trial as follows:
93. Id.
94. Duplantier Family P’ship v. BP Amoco, 2007-0293 (La. App. 4 Cir 5/16/07),
955 So. 2d 763; writ denied, 2007-1271 (La. 09/28/07), 964 So. 2d 368; 2007-1265
(La. 9/28/07), 964 So. 2d 368. As indicated in the cited passage, Duplantier was a
state court legacy litigation case that turned on the issue of the order of trial in a case
under section 30:29. 07-1271 (La. 09/28/2007); 964 So. 2d 367, 368.
95. Brownell Land Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d at 959 (internal citations omitted).
96. Alford v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 13 F. Supp. 3d 581, 589 (E.D. La. 2014);
see also, Alford v. Anadarko E&P Onshore L.L.C., No. 13-5457, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55724, at *10 n.25 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (internal citations omitted).

2016]

ACT 312

349

In Subsection H, the legislature specifically makes clear the
statute was not intended to change the substantive law. Subsection
H states that the procedure enacted by this Section shall not
preclude a landowner from pursuing a judicial remedy or
receiving a judicial award for private claims, other than those
remediation damages necessary to fund the feasible plan to
remediate the land to a standard that protects the public interest,
i.e. “except as otherwise provided in this Section.” If a court
awards remediation damages pursuant to an express contract
provision that is a greater amount than that ordered to be placed
into the court's registry to fund the remediation plan, then the
landowner is entitled to those “excess” remediation damages.
Likewise, “any award” for “additional remediation” may be kept
by the landowner, as well. If the money judgment for remediation
exceeds the amount necessary to fund the plan, the plaintiff is
granted a personal judgment for the “excess” remediation
damages; plaintiff is also granted a personal judgment on his other
non-remediation private claims (if he prevailed on such claims at
trial). All of these determinations are made part of a single
judgment, and any party aggrieved by any aspect of this single
judgment may appeal. The court of appeal correctly determined
“[t]he clear language of the statute contemplates the landowner
receiving an award in addition to that provided by the feasible
plan.” The legislature states that the procedure it enacts in this
legislation should not be interpreted as creating any cause of
action or to impose additional implied obligations under the
Mineral Code or arising out of a mineral lease that is not already
there. As previously discussed, this procedural statute does
nothing to the substantive rights of the landowner, whether arising
out of (1) the implied obligations of the mineral lease under the
Civil Code or (2) the implied obligation arising out of La. R.S.
31:122 if the landowner can show a mineral lessee has acted
unreasonably or excessively under the lease.97
B. Notice, Stay and State Intervention Provisions
As noted supra, the notice and stay provisions of Act 312 appear in
subsection 30:29(B). This subsection requires that the party filing a
judicial demand for environmental damage shall immediately “provide
timely notice to the state of Louisiana through the Department of Natural
97. State v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 2012-0884 (La. 10/30/13), 110 So. 3d
1038, 1054.
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Resources, commissioner of conservation and the attorney general,” and
makes additional provision for a stay of the litigation with respect to any
such judicial demands until thirty days after the issuance of the notice and
the filing into the record of return receipt(s) establishing receipt of the
notice.98 The law allows for the state’s intervention in the proceeding “in
accordance with the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.”99 Finally,
subsection 30:29(B)(4) provides: “No judgment or order shall be rendered
granting any relief in such litigation to which this Section applies, nor shall
the litigation be dismissed, until timely notice is received by the state of
Louisiana as set forth in this Subsection.”100
Weyerhauser v. Petro-Hunt represents one instance of a federal court’s
refusal to apply the notice and stay provisions of section 30:29 (B)(1) and
(2).101 That case was filed on October 21, 2004, prior to the enactment of
section 30:29.102 However, during the course of the litigation, section
30:29 was enacted, the plaintiff thereafter sought to invoke subsection
30:29(B)’s regulatory notice and stay provisions.103 The defendant
opposed this effort.104 On September 22, 2006, the court denied the
plaintiff’s motion to stay the action, with the note: “Denied. A state
statutory procedural stay is not applicable in this court.”105
It should be noted that, in response to a primary jurisdiction defense
raised by the defendant before the enactment of Act 312,106 the
Weyerhauser court had ordered the Plaintiff to seek the following from the
LDNR:
1) a determination regarding whether the well and/or wells at
issue had been operated according to the rules and regulations
of the OCC;
2) a determination regarding whether the plaintiff’s request for
injunctive relief (to prevent further environmental
contamination) was within the jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Conservation; and

98. La. R.S. § 30:29 (2007).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. 1:04-cv-02177 (W.D. La.).
102. The effective date of 2006 La. Acts 312 was June 8, 2006.
103. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. 1:04-cv-02177, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *6 (W.D. La. Sep. 29, 2008) (Doc. 101).
104. See generally, Weyerhauser Co.; id. (Doc. 102).
105. Id. (Doc. 104).
106. Id. (Doc. 13).
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3) such additional data as may be useful in disposing of the
issues before the court.107
Contemporaneously, the court had also stayed all proceedings in the
case, with the exception of those pertaining to discovery, pending the
receipt of information from the OCC.108 By the time the court’s denial of
a stay under the newly enacted section 30:29(B) in September, 2006,109 the
plaintiff had already initiated proceedings before the OCC. In denying a
stay under subsection 30:29(B), the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that the May, 2006 referral of issues to the OCC stood at odds with the
new statute and should be withdrawn.110 As a practical matter, the LDNR
had already been put on notice of the litigation.111
The Groundwater Remediation Act (GRA)112 contains a provision
similar to subsection 30:29(B). In fact, the GRA’s Part (B) requires that
those filing suit give notice of the filing to the LDEQ, and it recognizes
LDEQ’s right to intervene in litigation containing claims for recovery for
the evaluation and remediation of any contamination or pollution that is
alleged to impact or threaten usable ground water, in accordance with the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure. However, unlike section 30:29(B),
Part (B) of the GRA does not contain any provision for a stay of the
litigation after issuance of the notice. In Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
District Judge Fallon of the Eastern District refused to dispense with the
notice requirement of GRA, Part (B), which he characterized as “not
burdensome” and a procedure “that serves the purpose of allowing the
state agencies to intervene in the litigation.”113

107. See id.
108. Id.
109. Weyerhaeuser Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84329, at *6 (Doc. 104).
110. Id. (Doc. 99).
111. Id.
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1(B) (2016).
113. 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45123, at *19–20 (E.D. La. Dec. 29, 2005). In a
related ruling, Judge Fallon recognized that the plaintiffs had asserted a cause of
action in the case under the GRA (LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2015.1). Turner v.
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 609–10 (E.D. La. 2006). Cf., with
Brownell Land Co., v. Apache Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36594, at *18 (E.D.
La. Oct. 13, 2005) (finding that the notification was not necessary since plaintiff
did not make a claim that related to usable ground water), and Frank C. Minvielle.
L.L.C. v. IMC Global Operations, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 2d 755, 761 n.19 (W.D. La.
2004) (notification was not required because the plaintiffs expressly disclaimed
the pursuit of any claims for, or remediation of, ground water contamination.).
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C. The Preliminary Hearing
Subsection (B)(6) of title 30, section 29 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes,
in providing for the preliminary hearing added by the 2012 amendments,
prescribes: “Within sixty days of being served with a petition or amended
petition asserting an action, a defendant may request that the court conduct a
preliminary hearing to determine whether there is good cause for maintaining
the defendant as a party in the litigation.”114 From the time of its enactment,
disputes have arisen around whether Act 312 facilitates the employment of
the preliminary hearing vehicle in federal cases.
Of particular note in this vein is the ongoing litigation in Constance v.
Austral Oil Exploration Co.115 That case was filed on April 11, 2012, and,
within a short period of time, several defendants moved for the setting of
a preliminary hearing under newly enacted subsection 30:29(B)(6).116
Their efforts were unsuccessful, for on December 13, 2013, District Judge
Patricia Minaldi refused the defendants’ applications for preliminary
hearings under section 30:29(B)(6).117
Judge Minaldi started her analysis by noting the plaintiffs’ point under
Erie and the Rules Enabling Act118 that section 30:29 is a purely
procedural statute,119 so that it could not apply in federal court
proceedings. She also considered the defendants’ counterarguments that:
(1) section 30:29 satisfied Erie’s parameters for federal application
notwithstanding Louisiana Land;120 and (2) the statute must be applied in
the federal setting in order to discourage forum-shopping.121 Her analysis
of the Erie issue included her express consideration of the Brownell Land
holding that, even though it is procedural, parts of the Act are of such
significance that they can be applied in federal cases. In the end, the
Constance court found it unnecessary to reach an Erie determination in
disposing of the defendants’ motions for preliminary hearings:
114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(B)(6) (2016).
115. Constance v. Austral Oil Exploration Co., 2013 WL 6578178 (W.D. La.
Dec. 13, 2013).
116. The court’s ruling identifies the defendants’ motions covered thereby.
See, id. at *1.
117. Id. at *17
118. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2077 (2016).
119. The plaintiffs relied upon Louisiana Land & Exploration, 110 So. 3d at
1053 for this position. Constance, 2013 WL 6578178, at *15.
120. The defendants asserted that section 30:29 did not conflict with any
federal rule, so that, with application of the outcome-determinative test and
consideration of whether the state rule is “‘bound up’ with state-secured
substantive rights and obligations,” the statute must be regarded as part of a
cohesive statutory scheme designed to regulate the remediation of oilfield sites in
the state. Constance, 2013 WL 6578178, at *15.
121. Id.
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Assuming, arguendo, that the Act is applicable to a federal court
sitting in diversity, the Act’s plain language merely asserts that “a
defendant may request that the court conduct a preliminary
hearing.
***
Applying [the] interpretative principles [of statutory
construction], a plain reading of the Act indicates that it merely
gives the defendants the option to request a preliminary hearing.
The Act does not require that a preliminary hearing be held.
Rather, that decision seems to be at the discretion of the court.122
The court acknowledged the objective of Act 312’s preliminary
hearing to ensure a good faith basis for suit against each defendant, but it
also found that this objective was redundant given the plaintiff’s
underlying good faith obligation under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, the court noted that the plaintiffs had submitted
affidavit evidence of environmental damage in support of the basis for
maintaining the action.123 The court’s opinion continued:
There are two possibilities: either the Act is substantive in nature
or it is procedural. If it is substantive, then it must be applied by a
federal court sitting in diversity. However, in this instance,
assuming without deciding that the Act is substantive in nature, it
merely permits a defendant to request a preliminary hearing to
determine whether good cause is shown for maintaining suit
against it. As the Act does not guarantee that a preliminary hearing
be granted, and as the court finds that good cause has already been
shown by the plaintiff, the court is disinclined to grant the
defendants’ requests for a preliminary hearing. On the other hand,
if the Act is purely procedural in nature, then the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure control and a federal court sitting in diversity need
not follow the Act's procedural guidelines.124
Similarly, in Tureau v. 2H, Inc.,125 the defendants moved for the
setting of a preliminary hearing pursuant to section 30:29(B)(6) prior to
the removal of the case.126 Post removal, and after an initial round of
motion practice before the federal district court, the case was broken up
122. Id. at *16.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 2015 WL 4623615 (W.D. La. July 31, 2015).
126. See the discussion in Defendant Hess Corporation’s Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Preliminary Hearing Pursuant to La.Rev.Stat. § 30:29(B)(6) at
943, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969 (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2014) (Doc. 54-1).
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into three related cases.127 The pending motions were terminated, but with
an express grant of leave to refile.128 Hess Corporation, one of the Tureau
defendants, re-urged its motion for the setting of a preliminary hearing on
October 23, 2014, within a renewed sixty-day period.129 The plaintiff filed
an opposition to the motion on both factual and legal grounds; in
particular, the plaintiff directly challenged the applicability of Act 312 in
federal courts as a matter of law.130 Citing Weyerhauser, Constance, and
Louisiana Land & Exploration, the plaintiff asserted that “there is no
reasonable basis upon which to conclude that Act 312’s procedural rules
should be applied to the instant case.”131 The plaintiff also contended that
Judge Barbier’s conclusion in Brownell Land that a federal court is “bound
to follow the substantive law of the state, and even its procedural law,
when it affects substantive rights” was distinguishable.132 Hess responded
by filing a reply to the opposition maintaining the general applicability of
section 30:29 under Erie principles.133
In a Memorandum Order issued on April 22, 2015,134 the court denied
Hess’s motion for a preliminary hearing.135 Following the analysis set forth in
Constance, the court found the preliminary hearing vehicle of section 30:29
to be procedural—even if it were not (i.e., even if it were substantive), it would
not be binding because the preliminary hearing mechanism is volitional for
defendants and discretionary for the courts.136 In addition, the court criticized
the preliminary hearing concept as implicating illogical and wasteful federal
127. See id., Memorandum Order at 2318, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv02969 (W.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (Doc. 106), 2014 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 139780.
128. Id.
129. Id., Defendant Hess Corporation’s Motion for Preliminary Hearing
Pursuant to La. Rev. Stat. §30-29(B)(6) at 941, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv02969 (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2014) (Doc. 54).
130. Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Hearing, and in the
Alternative, Opposition to Preliminary Dismissal Filed on Behalf of Defendant,
Hess Corporation at 981, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969 (W.D. La. Nov.
13, 2014) (Doc. 57).
131. Id. at 993.
132. Id. The plaintiff argued that Brownell Land’s analogy to Louisiana’s
medical malpractice laws [now LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1231.1 to 1231.10]
was inapposite because Act 312 contains no requirement for the exhaustion of
administrative procedures prior to filing suit.
133. Hess Corporation’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion for
Preliminary Hearing Pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute Section 30:29(B)(6)
at 2061, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969 (W.D. La. Jan. 20, 2015) (Doc.
78). Hess cited All Plaintiffs v. All Defendants, 645 F.3d 329, 335-36 (5th Cir.
2011) in support of an Erie argument for application of Act 312’s preliminary
hearing feature based on Brownell Land.
134. Memorandum Order at 2318, Tureau v. 2H, Inc., No. 1:13-cv-02969
(W.D. La. Apr. 22, 2014) (Doc. 106).
135. Id. at 2318–19.
136. Id. at 2319.
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court proceedings.137 Finally and, as the court noted, most importantly, the
court had already found that the plaintiff had effectively stated a cause of
action for alleged contamination of his property.138 Thus, the court denied the
motion for preliminary hearing.139
In sum, the question of the availability of an Act 312 preliminary hearing
in federal court is unsettled. The issue appears to be regarded as one within
the realm of judicial discretion, as described in Constance.140 Its practical
similarity to Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a
salient consideration prejudicing liberal application of the preliminary hearing
mechanism in federal courts.
D. The Limited Admission and LDNR Determination of the Most
Feasible Plan
The Western District has recently recognized and employed, albeit in
absence of direct objection, two of the newest elements of the Act 312
panoply—namely, the option of the limited admission under Louisiana
Code of Civil Procedure article 1563 and the concomitant provision
governing the submission of a proffered “most feasible” remediation plan.
Moore v. Denbury Offshore, L.L.C. involved the rupture of a six-inch
saltwater flowline in Richland Parish, Louisiana.141 Following the rupture,
Denbury Offshore, L.L.C. (Denbury) notified the LDEQ of the incident
and began assessment and remediation activities at the site under the
supervision of the LDEQ.142 Roughly a year later, the plaintiff landowners
instituted an action in the Fifth Judicial District Court for the State of
Louisiana.143 Denbury removed the case to the Western District on the
basis of diversity of citizenship.144 Subsequently, Denbury stipulated to the
presence of environmental damage and moved for the entry of an order
referring the case to the LDNR pursuant to subsection 30:29(I)(1) and
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1563.145 The plaintiffs
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Of additional note, in consolidated cases concerning the Bayou Corne
Sinkhole, several defendants filed motions for preliminary hearings under section
30:29(B)(6). LeBlanc v. Texas Brine Co., L.L.C., No. 2:12-cv-2059 (E.D. La.
Aug. 10, 2012) (Docs. 59; 171; 174).
141. Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., No. 3:14-cv-00913 (W.D. La.).
142. See Motion for Entry of Order to Refer Matter to La. Dep’t of Natural Res.
for Public Hearing and Limited Admission of Responsibility for Envtl. Damage at 75,
Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Jan. 28, 2015) (Doc. 21).
143. Notice of Removal at 75, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La.
Apr. 29, 2014) (Doc. 1).
144. Id.
145. See supra note 142. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29(l)(1) (2007).
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responded to the Denbury motion,146 but they did not directly oppose
Denbury’s request for referral to the LDNR. The focus of their opposition
was the concern that the referral would delay the trial of the case.147 Stated
differently, the principal dispute between the parties at the time concerned
the procedural operation of article 1563—and not the defendant’s right to
invoke the procedure in a federal setting.148 In fact, three days before the
plaintiffs submitted their memorandum, the court had vacated the
Scheduling Order that had provided for a June 2015 trial date, with any
future scheduling “pending the Court’s ruling on Defendant’s Motion for
Entry of an Order to Refer the Matter to the Louisiana Department of
Natural Resources . . . .”149 The court granted the referral “for the development
of the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the environmental damage
on the Plaintiffs’ property to applicable state regulatory standards, in
accordance with [subsection] 30:29(C).”150 In the same Order, the court
specified the sequence and schedule for the submission of proposed plans to
the LDNR, as well as the requirement that Denbury post $100,000 with the
LDNR as security for the costs related to the OCC’s review of the plans and
the subsequent public hearing mandated under section 30:29.151
The parties to the case abided by the court’s requirements, and each
presented proposed plans of remediation to the LDNR.152 The LDNR
conducted a hearing and issued its determination of the most feasible
remediation plan.153 Its written findings, together with its reasons and
pertinent supporting documentation, were accepted for filing into the record
146. Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Entry of an Order to Refer
Matter to La. Dep’t of Natural Res. for Public Hearing and Limited Admission of
Responsibility for Envtl. Damage at 125, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C.
(W.D. La. Feb. 20, 2015) (Doc. 21).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Extension at 124,
Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Feb. 17, 2015) (Doc. 20).
150. Order Granting Motion 11 to Refer Matter to La. Dep’t of Natural Res.
Office of Conservation at 193, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Mar.
23, 2015) (Doc. 26).
151. Id.
152. The competing plans are available at the Environmental Division’s page
on the LDNR’s website. See Environmental Division, LDNR, http://dnr.louisiana
.gov/index.cfm?md=pagebuilder&tmp=home&pid=134&pnid=21&nid=27 (last
viewed Feb. 24, 2016) [https://perma.cc/775V-3XYJ].
153. See Motion for Leave to File Most Feasible Plan, Written Reasons, &
Affidavits with Consent of La. Dep’t of Natural Res. Office of Conservation at
203, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., (W.D. La. Oct. 22, 2015) (Doc. 28);
Order Granting Motion 28 for Leave to File Most Feasible Plan, Written Reasons,
& Affidavits at 244, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2015)
(Doc. 29); Most Feasible Plan by La. Dep’t of Natural Res. at 245, Moore v.
Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2015) (Doc. 30).
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of the federal case on October 23, 2015.154 The case settled shortly before it
was scheduled to go to trial in March 2016.
In practical terms, the applicability of Code of Civil Procedure article
1563 in the Moore case involved no controversy. But what was left unresolved
by the course of the case was the timing of the determination of the most
feasible plan in relation to a trial on the merits. As it turned out in Moore, the
LDNR reached a most feasible plan determination well prior to any scheduled
trial date, rendering that the issue moot.155 However, questions remain, both
on the state and federal levels, as to whether an unresolved administrative
process pursuant to article 1563 can serve to forestall or delay an Act 312 trial.
Moore is also interesting when contrasted against Brownell and
Constance, both of which predated enactment of the limited admission
provisions of article 1563. In Constance, the federal court characterized
the Act 312’s preliminary hearing provisions as discretionary in federal
court.156 The court reasoned that, even if Act 312’s preliminary hearing
vehicle were a substantive right under Erie, the Act does not guarantee the
right to such a hearing.157 Correspondingly, the Constance court found that
if Act 312’s preliminary hearing element creates a procedural right, then
the federal court is not bound to follow the Act’s procedural guidelines.158
In Moore, the defendant submitted that Act 312’s limited admission
procedures affect substantive rights.159 Moreover, in contrast to the
potentially discretionary preliminary hearing provisions of subsection
30:29(B)(6), article 1563(A)(2) directs that, upon submission of a timely
limited admission, a court “shall refer the matter to the [Louisiana]
Department of Natural Resources, office of conservation . . . to conduct a
public hearing to approve or structure a plan which the department
determines to be the most feasible plan to evaluate or remediate the
environmental damage under the applicable regulatory standards pursuant
to the provisions of R.S. 30:29.”160 Thus, in terms of existing
jurisprudence, the argument in favor of federal courts applying article
1563’s limited admission and most feasible plan elements would appear
to rest on stronger footing than its preliminary hearing counterpart.
154. See Order Granting Motion 28 for Leave to File Most Feasible Plan,
Written Reasons, & Affidavits at 244, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D.
La. Oct. 23, 2015) (Doc. 29); Most Feasible Plan by La. Dep’t of Natural Res. at
245, Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C. (W.D. La. Oct. 23, 2015) (Doc. 30).
155. The LDNR submittal took place in October, 2015. The case was
scheduled for trial in March, 2016.
156. Constance, 2013 WL 6578178, at *16.
157. Id. at *17.
158. Id.
159. Moore v. Denbury Onshore, L.L.C., No. 3:14CV913, 2016 WL 393549,
at *1 (W.D. La. Feb. 1, 2016); see, e.g. Rec.Doc. 19, Page ID # 120.
160. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1563 (A)(2) (2014).
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E. The Remediation Plan Provisions
With the exception of the Moore case, there appears to be no other
instance of a federal court’s application of the “most feasible plan”
provisions of Act 312. Based on spoliation of evidence, the court in
Weyerhauser entered an adverse evidentiary inference against the
defendant of environmental damage, but it reserved determination of the
extent of such damage for future resolution.161 However, in addressing the
plaintiff’s insistence upon the applicability of section 30:29, the
Weyerhauser court stated:
While finding the statute helpful in reaching the present ruling, we
decline to apply the procedural aspects of this state statute in the
present diversity action. Accordingly, we refrain from ordering the
development of ‘a plan or submittal for the evaluation or remediation
to applicable standards of the contamination that resulted in the
environmental damage’ or similar procedural undertakings in this
case.162
The Weyerhauser case proceeded through additional discovery and
pre-trial development following this ruling, and it ultimately settled.163
Interestingly, in presenting the settlement to the court, the parties
acknowledged the applicability of Act 312 and affirmatively sought court
approval pursuant to subsection 30:29(J).164
F. The Approval of Settlements
Subsection 30:29(J) addresses the requisites for any settlement
reached in a case “subject to the provisions of this Section.” It has not been
amended since its original enactment in 2006. In addition to requiring
court approval, the subsection requires that the parties notify the LDNR
and the LOAG of the settlement in principle. Those agencies are allowed
thirty days to review the settlement and comment to the court. Section
30:29(J)(1) further states:
If after a contradictory hearing the court requires remediation, the
court shall not certify or approve any settlement until an amount
161. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. CIV A 1:04-CV-02177,
2008 WL 4425466, at *3 (W.D. La. Sept. 30, 2008).
162. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:29 (C)(1) (2007).
163. See, e.g., Weyerhauser v. Petro-Hunt, L.L.C., 1:04-CV-02177 (W.D.La.
07/22/09) (Rec.Doc. 402; Page ID #5022).
164. Id., (07/20/09) (Rec.Doc. 396, Page ID# 4964) and (07/29/09) (Rec.Doc.
401, Page ID# 5021).
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of money sufficient to fund such remediation is deposited into the
registry of the court. No funding of a settlement shall occur until
the requirements of this Section have been satisfied. However, the
court shall have the discretion to waive the requirements of this
Section if the settlement reached is for a minimal amount and is
not dispositive of the entire litigation.165
Weyerhauser, as discussed supra, involved a joint motion made by
settling parties under subsection 30:29(J) for the approval of a settlement
based upon the submission of correspondence to and from the LDNR and
the LOAG.166 The parties made no representation in their motion of the
absence of court-ordered remediation, and the settlement under review
involved all parties then in the case.167 The settlement agreement was
submitted to the court under seal.168 Based upon this information, the court
approved the settlement and ordered the dismissal of the case upon the
submission of a stipulation of dismissal by the parties, with each party to
bear its own costs.169
In Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., the parties
invoked subsection 30:29(J) and affirmatively sought the federal district
court’s validation of a settlement reached in litigation negotiations.170 The
parties secured a letter of no objection from the LDNR and submitted that
document to the court in compliance with the requirements of the
statute.171 They also produced copies of the underlying settlement
agreements for submission to the court.172
However, unlike Weyerhauser, the settlement of the case involved
fewer than all parties to the litigation—the remaining defendants being
two CGL insurers for a bankrupt defendant.173 The settling defendants
requested that the court retain jurisdiction over the case while the
165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §30:29(J)(2) provides:
“In the event a settlement is agreed to between the parties in a case in
which the department or the attorney general has intervened, such agency
shall be entitled to recover from the settling defendants all costs,
including investigation, evaluation, and review costs; expert witness
fees; and reasonable attorney fees.”
166. Weyerhauser Co., 1:04-CV-02177, (07/20/09; Rec.Doc. 396, Page ID#
4964) and (07/29/09; Rec.Doc. 401, Page ID# 5021).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Weyerhauser Co., 1:04-CV-02177 (07/29/09; Rec.Doc. 401, Page ID#
5021).
170. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., 1:10 CV 01684
(W.D.La.); see Rec.Doc. 35, Page ID# 396 (06/06/12).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.

360

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. IV

remediation contemplated in the settlement proceeded and the parties
attempted to work out inter sese the resolution of the remaining claims.174
Having considered the positions of the parties, the court concluded that the
settlement complied with the provisions of section 30:29 and entered
judgment approving the settlement in June, 2012.175 In so doing, however,
the court required periodic reporting from the parties as to the progress of
the extra-judicial remediation plan encompassed within the settlement.176
No apparent issue arose concerning the actual applicability vel non of
the provisions of subsection 30:29(J) in federal cases; the parties
affirmatively represented that the case was indeed subject to the provisions
of that section.177 The record made no indication of a court-ordered
remediation, nor of the court’s requiring or waiving a deposit into the
registry of the court of money sufficient to fund the extra-judicial
remediation.178 Although the settlement, on its face, involved fewer than
all parties to the case, the settling parties sought and were granted a
judgment that included, inter alia, the plaintiffs’ assignment—and the
settling defendants’ correlative reservation—of rights as against all nonsettling defendants.179
The record did not indicate that the settlement had been reached for a
“minimal amount.” Nevertheless, the settlement presented to the court
called for remediation to be carried out extra-judicially,180 with no formal
edict of the court requiring remediation. Thus, while the record does not
dispel the possibility that the court and the parties viewed the statutory
provisions as being non-binding, there appeared a firm basis for the
manner of judicial acceptance of the settlement, even under the terms of
subsection 30:29(J).
Sweet Lake Land and Oil Company v. Exxon Mobil stands as another
example of an Act 312 case involving settlements subject to the review of
the federal district court. All principal parties to that suit reached two
agreements in principle to settle the litigation in February, 2012; the basic
174. Id.
175. Id., (06/21/12) (Rec.Doc. 42, Page ID# 451; Rec.Doc. 44 (transcript),
Page ID# 454).
176. Id.; see Minute Entry (11/16/12, Rec.Doc. 50, Page ID# 472); Joint Status
Report (05/31/13, Rec.Doc. 51, Page ID# 473);Order, Rec.Doc. 52 (09/11/13,
Page ID# 482); Updated Joint Status Report, Rec.Doc. 53 (12/31/13, Page ID#
483); Order, Rec.Doc. 54 (01/07/14, Page ID# 489); Updated Joint Status Report,
Rec.Doc. 55 (12/31/14, Page ID# 490).
177. See Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., Joint Motion
for Approval of Settlement (06/06/12, Rec.Doc. 35, Page ID# 396).
178. Id.
179. Id.; see Transcript of Motion Hearing, (07/11/12, Rec.Doc. 44, Page ID#
454).
180. Id.
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settlements provided for the resolution of all but a third party demand of a
single defendant.181 As in Crowell Land, details of the two proposed
settlements were thereafter presented to the OCC; and the OCC issued a
letter of no objection regarding both.182 Subsequently, the parties moved
under subsection 30:29(J)(1) for orders from the federal court approving
the settlements and for judgments of partial dismissal.183 In their motions,
the parties noted that the case was subject to section 30:29, and subsection
(J)(1) in particular.184 Both motions contained representations that neither
of the settlements resolved the entire litigation and that the parties had
made arrangements to remediate the property to regulatory standards.185
The OCC response letter, submitted into the record in support of both
motions, represented that the OCC bore no objections to the settlements,
but noted in addition: “Based upon the two settlements, it does not appear
that any portion of the settlement amounts are to be placed into the registry
of the court for remediation expenses associated with the Property as may
be required under certain circumstances pursuant to La. R.S. 30:29.”186 In
August of 2012, the court granted the approval motions and entered partial
dismissals in both instances, without requiring the deposit of monies into
the registry of the court for the investigation and/or remediation of the
subject property.187 Furthermore, despite its earlier intervention in the
case, the LDNR did not judicially seek costs, fees, or expenses in
connection with the resolution of the case.
Another federal legacy litigation case, Maryland Company, L.L.C. v.
Exxon Mobil, was brought to settlement in May, 2012, under the oversight of
District Judge Haik.188 In the course of the litigation, defendant Exxon-Mobil
moved to compel the plaintiff and other defendants which had agreed to a
settlement among themselves to comply with the requirements of subsection
181. The Sweet Lake Land and Oil Co., v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2:09-CV01100 (W.D.La.). See also, Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Pursuant to
La.R.S. 30:20.J and for Partial Final Judgment, 2:09-CV-01100 (07/12/12;
Rec.Doc. 613; Page ID# 10092); Joint Motion and Incorporated Memorandum to
Approve Settlement Pursuant to La.R.S. 30:20.J and for Partial Final Judgment,
2:09-CV-01100 (07/27/12; Rec.Doc. 617; Page ID# 10125).
182. Id. at 2:09-CV-01100 (07/10/12; Rec.Doc. 612; Page ID# 10088).
183. See supra note 181.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at Rec.Doc. 612, Page ID # 10088 (07/10/12).
187. See Minutes of Court, 2:09-CV-01100 (08/28/12; Rec.Doc. 623; Page
ID# 10144); Partial Final Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice, 2:09-CV-01100
(08/28/12; Rec.Doc. 625 Page ID# 10168); and Partial Final Judgment of
Dismissal with Prejudice, 2:09-CV-01100 (08/28/12; Rec.Doc. 627 Page ID#
10434).
188. Maryland Co. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 6:10-CV-01781 (W.D.La. Feb. 1,
2012).
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(J) of title 30, section 29 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.189 The court,
however, deferred ruling on that motion and the case ended up settling in its
entirety.190 Of the subsequent motions for settlement approval, none called for
continuing judicial oversight of remediation or registry deposits of settlement
funds, and all were supported by conditional letters of no objection from the
LDNR.191 While the settlement agreements themselves were confidential, the
court ruled that: (1) the settlements were approved; (2) the third party
defendant was to accept responsibility for clean-up of the site and the handling
of all issues of regulatory compliance pursuant to the settlement agreement
involving that party; and (3) the plaintiff’s claims and the third party claim
were dismissed with prejudice, and for the most part with all parties being
ordered to bear their own costs.192
Judge Vance of the Eastern District followed a similar course of action in
June, 2012, in C. S. Gaidry case.193 Based upon the presentation by the parties
of a joint motion supported by the requisite correspondence to and from the
public authorities, together with a redacted copy of the settlement agreement
confected in the case,194 the court ordered the dismissal of the action, with
prejudice, subject to “[d]efendants’ obligation to perform the obligations set
forth in the Settlement Agreement.”195 Again, there was no requirement that

189. Id., Motion to Require Compliance with Settlement Provisions of La.R.S.
30:29 on Behalf of Exxon Mobil Corporation, 6:10-CV-01781 (01/31/12; Rec.Doc.
231; Page ID# 7694). The motion was subsequently denied as moot. Id., Order, 6:10CV-01781 (03/28/12; Rec.Doc. 252; Page ID# 7856).
190. Id., Order, 6:10-CV-01781 (03/29/12; Rec.Doc. 253; Page ID# 7858). In
this provisional thirty-day order of dismissal based on the settlement, the court
required the parties to submit a joint stipulation of dismissal pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. P. 41 in addition to a joint motion for approval of the settlement. The court
retained jurisdiction over the case and the settlement for the purposes of, inter
alia, receiving input from the LOAG and the OCC and considering approval of
the settlement.
191. Id., Motion on Behalf of Maryland to: (1) Approve Settlement with
Burlington and (2) to Dismiss Maryland’s Claims against Burlington and
Quintana Defendants, 6:10-CV-01781 (03/27/12; Rec.Doc. 247; Page ID# 7806);
Joint Motion per Order Doc. No. 253 (1) to Approve Settlement and (2) for
Dismissal Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41, 6:10-CV-01781 (05/10/12; Rec.Doc.
257; Page ID# 7875).
192. Id., Judgment, 6:10-CV-01781 (05/31/12; Rec.Doc. 264; Page ID# 7900).
The qualification on each party paying its own costs is due to the absence of any
statement in the final judgment to that effect with regard to the third party claim.
193. C. S. Gaidry, Inc. v. Union Oil Co. of California, 2:09-CV-02762, 2009
U.S.Dist.LEXIS 83096 (E.D.La. Aug. 26, 2009).
194. Id.; See Joint Motion for Court Approval of Settlement Pursuant to Act
312 of 2006, La.R.S. 30:29 § J(1) and to Dismiss with Prejudice, (06/07/12;
Rec.Doc. 125).
195. See id.; Order and Final Judgment (06/18/12; Rec.Doc. 126).
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a deposit into the court registry of funds associated with remediation of the
property.196 The settlement disposed of the entire litigation.197
Martin v. Tesoro Corp. represents a more recent handling of judicial
approval of settlements pursuant to Act 312. The parties in that suit
included in their motions the representations that no finding had been
made in the case that any defendant was a responsible party within the
meaning of section 30:29, or that any environmental damage existed on
any portion of the property.198 Consistent with the motions, the court
entered final judgments dismissing the action, with prejudice, with no
requirement of deposit and with no provision for continuing judicial
oversight of the remediation plans.199
In sum, this survey of Act 312 federal litigation reveals no instance of
a court’s ordering any settling party to deposit monies into a court registry
pursuant to subsection 30:29(J)(1). Likewise, there appears to be no
recorded instance of a settlement involving a federal courts’ mandate of
remediation, apart from the rare qualification that the parties remediate the
involved property in accordance with the terms of the given settlement
agreement. Furthermore, none of the cases reviewed include any award to
the state pursuant to subsection 30:29(J)(2). A higher likelihood of coming
across a settlement involving a registry deposit, or court-supervised
remediation, or regulatory reimbursement seemingly would exist in an Act
312 case that included the LDNR as a direct party.
F. Judicial Oversight of the Most Feasible Remediation Plan’s
Implementation
As noted earlier, in Crowell Land, the settlement presented to and
approved by the court called for the parties themselves to manage any
extra-judicial remediation to be carried out under LDNR’s oversight; no

196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Martin v. Tesoro Corp., 2:11-CV-01413 (W.D.La. May 21, 2012). See
Joint Motion to Approve Settlement Pursuant to La.R.S. 30:29.J and for Final
Judgment under FED. R. CIV. P.54(b) Dismissing with Prejudice Plaintiff’s Claims
against Defendants Koch, Tesoro, and ConocoPhillips (id., Aug. 29, 2013
(Rec.Doc. 116; Page ID# 1612)); Order, (id., Sept. 5, 2013 (Rec.Doc. 117; Page
ID# 1627)); Motion to Approve Settlement Pursuant to La.R.S. 30:29.J and for
Final Judgment under FED. R. CIV. P.54(b) Dismissing with Prejudice Plaintiff’s
Claims against Defendants BP America Production Company, Successor in
Interest to Amoco Production Company and Stanolind Oil and Gas Company (id.,
June 19, 2014 (Rec.Doc. 118; Page ID# 1629)); Order, (id., July 24, 2014
(Rec.Doc. 119; Page ID# 1635); and OCC Letter (id., Oct. 8, 2014 (Rec.Doc. 120;
Page ID# 1637).
199. Id.
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court-ordered remediation was involved.200 Nevertheless, the settlement
did not dispose of the case, and the court maintained authority over the
course and completion of the remediation.201 In fact, the court continued
to require the parties to submit periodic reports on the progress of the
effort.202 Further, any open litigation matters on the docket regarding other
parties were preserved for future action as necessary.203
In comparison, the settlements in Sweet Lake Land and Maryland
Company also provided for private, extra-judicial remediation of the
properties made subject of the suits.204 Again, no court-ordered
remediation was provided for as part of the approval process.205 In those
cases, however, the courts did not exercise supervisory authority over, nor
monitoring of, the progress of the remediation efforts.206
G. Provisions for the Allowance of Costs and Attorney’s Fees
While this article has discussed Weyerhauser,207 supra, in the contexts
of the notice and stay provisions of subsection 30:29(B), the court’s
rejection of the remediation plan feature of subsection 30:29(C)(1), and
the settlement approval processes set forth in subsection 30:29(J), the case
also reaches into substantive considerations.208 In the very same ruling in
which it rejected the procedural aspects of the statute—the Weyerhauser
court noted, “in a more substantive vein,” the statute’s provision for the
award of attorney’s fees against the party responsible for the
environmental damage.209 The court acknowledged the plaintiff’s request
for an award of fees under the statute arising out of the adverse inferential
finding of environmental damage entered against the defendant.210 Citing
200. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., 1:10-CV-01684
(W.D.La. July 11, 2012); Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement (June 6, 2012,
Rec.Doc. 35, Page ID# 396).
201. Id. See also Transcript of Motion Hearing, Crowell Land & Mineral Corp.
v. Sonoran Energy, Inc., 1:10-CV-01684, Rec.Doc. 44, Page ID# 454 (W.D.La.
July 11, 2012).
202. See supra note 200.
203. Id.
204. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 2:09-CV-01100; Maryland Co., 6:10-CV01781.
205. See supra notes 181–192.
206. Id.
207. Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No.1:04-CV-02177, 2008 WL
4425466 (W.D.La. Sept. 29, 2008).
208. Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt L.L.C., No. 1:04-CV-02177, 2006 WL
1228843 (W.D.La. May 2, 2006) dismissed by, Weyerhauser Co. v. Petro-Hunt
L.L.C., 2008 WL 4425466 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2008).
209. Weyerhauser, 2008 WL 4425466 at *4.
210. Id. at *3–4.
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Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Federal Insurance Company,211 the court also
noted that an award of attorney’s fees is governed by the “substantive law
applied to the underlying claims.”212 Thus, while recognizing a basis for
an award, the court held the determination of the amount of any fee award
in abeyance pending resolution of the case on the merits “or otherwise.”213
V. CONCLUSION
One common factor appearing repeatedly in federal cases dealing with
Act 312 is the courts’ lack of hesitance in assessing various legacy
litigation elements and claims under the parameters of Rules 12(b)(6),
12(e), and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Louisiana
substantive law apart from Act 312.214 Clearly, federal courts are more
focused upon the substantive elements of legacy litigation than the procedures
prescribed by Act 312.215 In fact, Act 312 appears to assume only secondary
importance in the analysis, at least with regard to the pre-judgment stages.216
As for the practical order of litigation, “[u]nless a defendant admits
responsibility or liability for ‘environmental damage’ as defined by the Act .
. . all claims, including contractual and private claims, are determined by the
finder of fact at trial.”217 The procedure at trial is well established; the notion
that the Act requires that there first be a trial on liability—and only thereafter
a trial on damages—has been widely rejected by both state and federal
courts.218 Instead, the fact-finder reaches a determination on both liability and
damages.219 At that point, assuming a finding for the claimant, Act 312 sets
forth additional procedures to be used for the post-trial determination of the
211. Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Federal Insurance Co., 410 F.3d 214, 230 (5th Cir.
2005).
212. Weyerhauser, 2008 WL 4425466, at *3–4; See also Ingalls, 410 F.3d 214,
230 (5th Cir. 2005).
213. Weyerhauser, 2008 WL 4425466 at *4.
214. See, e.g., Constance v. Austral Oil Expl. Co., No. 2:12-CV-1252, 2013
WL 6578178, at *1 (W.D. La. Dec. 13, 2013).; Alford v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.,
13 F.Supp. 3d 581, 589 n.25 (E.D.La. Apr. 1, 2014) (order as modified); Alford
v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, L.L.C., No. 2:13-CV-05457 (ref. 2:13-CV-05703),
2014 WL 1612454, at *4 (E.D.La. Apr. 22, 2014).
215. Id.
216. “Section 30:29 merely specifies the procedures applicable to lawsuits
alleging environmental damage; the substantive law is supplied by the Louisiana
Civil and Mineral Codes and other applicable statutory law and jurisprudence. See
La. Rev. Stat. § 30:29(H).” Alford, 13 F.Supp.3d at 589 n.25.
217. Louisiana. v. La. Land & Exploration Co., 2012-0884, p. 18 (La. Jan. 30,
2013); 110 So.3d 1038, 1051. “At trial (in the absence of an admission), the finder
of fact must initially determine whether environmental damage exists and whether
the defendant or defendants are legally responsible therefore.” Id.
218. Id.; see also, Brownell Land Co., 538 F.Supp. 2d at 957–59.
219. Brownell Land Co., 538 F.Supp. 2d at 957–59.
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most feasible remediation plan. Once the most feasible plan is determined, the
court will order the parties found legally responsible to fund the
implementation of that plan, and the portion of the damage award attributable
to that implementation shall be deposited into the registry of the court, for
disbursement during the course of plan implementation under the continued
monitoring and oversight of the trial court.220
Federal courts have accepted invitations to approve pre-trial settlements
of legacy litigation claims under subsection 30:29(J), at least through the
exercise of judicial discretion or party consent.221 Although subsection
30:29(J)(1) provides that “[n]o funding of a settlement shall occur until the
requirements of this Section have been satisfied,” the key distinguishing
element is likely the voluntary—and not judicially imposed—assumption of
responsibility for the remediation effort.
Finally, it appears that fees may be awardable to a party successfully
suing for environmental damage and remediation based, at least in part, upon
the provisions of subsection 30:29(E). The argument would be that the
subsection gives rise to a substantive basis under Louisiana law for the
allowance of such an award.
A key point to be taken from this discussion lies in the conclusion that the
public interest at stake in judicial confirmation of litigation-funded
remediation implementation is so great that labels of procedure and substance
lose primary significance. In fact, the theme of this analysis harkens back to
Judge Barbier’s prescient statements in 2007 in Brownell Land. The public’s
interest in protecting, conserving, and replenishing the natural resources and
environment of the state remains so fundamental and significant that,
notwithstanding the overall procedural nature of the mother statute, some
elements of Act 312 simply must be enforced by the federal courts. The
Western District has echoed this principle: “Act 312 and the proper
administration of justice compels [a federal] court to consideration of
existence of contamination, responsibility for its remediation, and a plan for
that remediation for the property involved in [the] litigation.”222 Primarily, this
might include the post-judgment aspects of the Act, such as the judicial
determination, oversight and certification of the most feasible judicially
mandated remediation plan—whether that mandate be through order, or
verdict, or approved settlement calling for judicial involvement and oversight.
As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in Louisiana Land & Exploration,
and reiterated in Savoie, the Act makes no change to normal trial

220. Id.
221. Cf. Sweet Lake, with Crowell Land, supra note 181.
222. Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co., 2:09-cv-01100 (09/01/11, Rec.Doc. 236;
Page ID# 3252 at pp. 12–13).
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procedures.223 Unless a defendant admits liability for environmental damage
or remediation, or both, a case proceeds to trial in the same manner as any
other proceeding.224 Even though all claims go to the fact-finder, the trial
judge remains the final arbiter and administrator of the most feasible plan for
remediation of the property to state regulatory standards.225 This approach
would appear to apply equally in Louisiana’s federal courts.
Therefore, while questions might persist as to the applicability of purely
procedural elements of Act 312, such as the preliminary hearing or notice and
stay provisions of the Act, public policy considerations countenance in favor
of a federal court’s adherence to the post-judgment and settlement-approval
features of the Act 312.

223. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 2012-0884, p.15
(La. 01/30/13); 110 So. 3d 1038, 1051; Savoie v. Richard, 2013-1370, pp. 7–8
(La. 04/02/14); 137 So.3d 78, 85–86.
224. Id.
225. Id.

